In this paper we propose two public key BE schemes that have efficient complexity measures. The first scheme, called the PBE-PI scheme, has O(r) header size, O(1) public keys and O(log N ) private keys per user, where r is the number of revoked users. This is the first public key BE scheme that has both public and private keys under O(log N ) while the header size is O(r). These complexity measures match those of efficient secret key BE schemes.
Introduction
Assume that there is a set U of N users. We would like to broadcast a message to a subset S of them such that only the (authorized) users in S can obtain the message, while the (revoked) users not in S cannot get information about the message. Broadcast encryption is a bandwidth-saving method to achieve this goal via cryptographic key-controlled access. In broadcast encryption, a dealer sets up the system and assigns each user a set of private keys such that the broadcasted messages can be decrypted by authorized users only. Broadcast encryption has many applications, such as pay-TV systems, encrypted file sharing systems, digital right management, content protection of recordable data, etc.
A broadcasted message M is sent in the form Hdr (S, m), E m (M ) , where m is a session key for encrypting M via a symmetric encryption method E. An authorized user in S can use his private keys to decrypt the session key m from Hdr (S, m). Since the size of E m (M ) is pretty much the same for all broadcast encryption schemes, we are concerned about the header size. The performance measures of a broadcast encryption scheme are the header size, the number of private keys held by each user, the size of public parameters of the system (public keys), the time for encrypting a message, and the time for decrypting the header by an authorized user. A broadcast encryption scheme should be able to resist the collusion attack from revoked users. A scheme is fully collusion-resistant if even all revoked users collude, they get no information about the broadcasted message.
Broadcast encryption schemes can be stateless or stateful. For a stateful broadcast encryption scheme, the private keys of a user can be updated from time to time, while the private keys of a user in a stateless broadcast encryption scheme remain the same through the lifetime of the system. Broadcast encryption schemes can also be public key or secret key. For a public key BE scheme, any one (broadcaster) can broadcast a message to an arbitrary group of authorized users by using the public parameters of the system, while for a secret key broadcast encryption scheme, only the special dealer, who knows the system secrets, can broadcast a message.
In this paper we refer "stateless public key broadcast encryption" as "public key BE".
Our Contribution
We propose two public key BE schemes that have efficient complexity measures. The first scheme, called the PBE-PI scheme (broadcast encryption with polynomial interpolation), has O(r) header size, O(1) public keys, and O(log N ) private keys per user 1 , where r is the number of revoked users. This is the first public key BE scheme that has both public and private keys under O(log N ) while the header size is O(r). These complexity measures match those of efficient secret key BE schemes [11, 20, 21] . The idea is to run log N copies of the basic scheme in [17, 19, 22] in parallel for lifting the restriction on a priori fixed number of revoked users. Nevertheless, if we implement the log N copies straightforwardly, we would get a scheme of O(N ) public keys. We are able to use the properties of bilinear maps as well as special private key assignment to eliminate the need of O(N ) public keys and make it a constant number. Our second scheme, called the PBE-SD-PI scheme (public key SD broadcast encryption with polynomial interpolation), is constructed by combining the polynomial interpolation technique and the subset cover method in the SD scheme [16] . The PBE-SD-PI scheme has O(r) header size, O(1) public key and O(log N ) private keys per user. They are the same as those of the PBE-PI scheme. Nevertheless, the decryption time is remarkably O(1). This is the first public key broadcast encryption scheme that has O(1) decryption time while other complexity measures are kept low.
Our basic schemes are one-way secure against full collusion of revoked users in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption. We modify our schemes to have indistinguishably security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. The comparison with some other public key BE schemes with full collusion resistance is shown in Table 1 .
Related Work
Fiat and Naor [8] formally proposed the concept of static secret key broadcast encryption. Many researchers followed to propose various broadcast encryption schemes, e.g., see [11, 12, 16, 17, 20] .
Kurosawa and Desmedt [13] proposed a pubic-key BE scheme that is based on polynomial interpolation and traces at most k traitors. The similar schemes of Noar and Pinkas [17] , Tzeng and Tzeng [19] , and Yoshida and Fujiwara [22] allow revocation of up to k users. Kurosawa and Yoshida [14] generalized the polynomial interpolation (in fact, the Reed-Solomon code) to any linear code for constructing public key BE schemes. The schemes in [7, 13, 14, 17, 19, 22] all have O(k) public keys, O(1) private keys, and O(r) header size, r ≤ k. However, k is a-priori fixed 
N -the number of users. r -the number of revoked users. † -the transformed SD scheme [6] instantiated with constant-size HIBE [2] . ‡ -the parallel extension of [17, 19, 22] .
-the public keys are needed for decrypting the header by a user.
-group operation/modular exponentiation and excluding the time for scanning the header.
during the system setting and the public key size depends on it. These schemes can withstand the collusion attack of up to k revoked users only. They are not fully collusion-resistant. Yoo, et al. [21] observed that the restriction of a pre-fixed k can be lifted by running log N copies of the basic scheme with different degrees (from 2 0 to N ) of polynomials. They proposed a scheme of O(log N ) private keys and O(r) header size such that r is not restricted. However, their scheme is secret key and the system has O(N ) secret values. In the public key setting, the public key size is O(N ).
Recently Boneh, et al. [4] proposed a public key BE scheme that has O(1) header size, O(1) private keys, and O(N ) public keys. By trading off the header size and public keys, they gave another scheme with O( √ N ) header size, O(1) private keys and O( √ N ) public keys. Lee, et al. [15] proposed a better trade-off by using receiver identifiers in the scheme. It achieves O(1) public key, O(log N ) private keys, but, O(r log N ) header size. Boneh and Waters [5] proposed a scheme that has the traitor tracing capability. This type of schemes [4, 5, 15] has the disadvantage that the public keys are needed by a user in decrypting the header. Thus, the de-facto private key of a user is the combination of the public key and his private key.
It is possible to transform a secret key BE scheme into a public key one. For example, Dodis and Fazio [6] transformed the SD and LSD schemes [12, 16] into public key SD and LSD schemes, shorted as PBE-SD and PBE-LSD. The transformation employs the technique of hierarchical identity-based encryption to substitute for the hash function. Instantiated with the newest constant-size hierarchical identity-based encryption [2] 
Preliminaries
Bilinear map. We use the properties of bilinear maps. Let G and G 1 be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order q andê be a bilinear map from G × G to G 1 . Then,ê has the following properties.
For all u, v ∈ G and x, y
BDH hardness assumption. The BDH problem is to computeê(g, g) abc from given (g, g a , g b , g c ).
We say that BDH is (t, )-hard if for any probabilistic algorithm A with time bound t, there is some k 0 such that for any
Broadcast encryption. A public key BE scheme Π consists of three probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms:
It takes as input the security parameter z, a system identity Id and a set U of users and outputs a public key P K and N private key sets SK 1 , SK 2 , . . . , SK N , one for each user in U.
-Enc(P K, S, M ). It takes as input the public key PK, a set S ⊆ U of authorized users and a message M and outputs a pair Hdr (S, m), C of the ciphertext header and body, where m is a randomly generated session key and C is the ciphertext of M encrypted by m via some standard symmetric encryption scheme, e.g., AES.
-Dec(SK k , Hdr (S, m), C). It takes as input the private key SK k of user U k , the header Hdr (S, m) and the body C. If U k ∈ S, it computes the session key m and then uses m to decrypt C for the message M . If U k ∈ S, it cannot decrypt the ciphertext.
The system is correct if all users in S can get the broadcasted message M . Security. We describe the indistinguishability security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security) for broadcast encryption as follows [4] . Here, we focus on the security of the session key, which in turn guarantees the security of the ciphertext body C. Let Enc * and Dec * be like Enc and Dec except that the message M and the ciphertext body C are omitted. The security is defined by an adversary A and a challenger C via the following game.
Init. The adversary A chooses a system identity Id and a target set S * ⊆ U of users to attack.
Setup. The challenger C runs Setup(1 z , Id, U) to generate a public key P K and private key sets 
Query phase 1. The adversary A issues decryption queries
Q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of form (U k , S, Hdr(S, m)), S ⊆ S * , U k ∈ S,
Query phase 2. The adversary A issues more decryption queries
y = y, and the challenger C responds with Dec * (SK k , y ).
Guess. A outputs a guess b for b.
In the above the adversary A is static since it chooses the target set S * of users before the system setup. Let Adv ind-cca A,Π (z) be the advantage that A wins the above game, that is,
where 
In this paper we first give schemes with one-way security against chosen plaintext attacks (OW-CPA security) and then transform them to have IND-CCA security via the FujisakiOkamoto transformation [9] . The OW-CPA security is defined as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs Setup(1 z , Id, U) to generate a public key P K and private key sets
Challenge. The challenger C runs Enc * (P K, S * ) and outputs Hdr (S * , m), where m is randomly chosen.
Guess. A outputs a guess m for m.
Since A can always encrypt a chosen plaintext by himself, the oracle of encrypting a chosen plaintext does not matter in the definition. Let Adv
ow-cpa
A,Π (z) be the advantage that A wins the above game, that is,
Definition 2 A public key BE scheme Π=(Setup, Enc, Dec) is (t, )-OW-CPA secure if for all t-time bounded adversary A, we have Adv
ow-cpa A,Π (z) < .
The PBE-PI Scheme
Let G and G 1 be the bilinear groups with the pairing functionê, where q is a large prime. Let H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → G 1 be two hash functions and E be a symmetric encryption with key space G 1 . The idea of our construction is as follows. For a polynomial f (x) of degree t, we assign each user U i a share f (i). The secret is f (0). We can compute the secret f (0) from any t + 1 shares. If we want to revoke t users, we broadcast their shares. Any non-revoked user can compute the secret f (0) from his own share and the broadcasted ones, totally t + 1 shares. On the other hand, any collusion of revoked users cannot compute the secret f (0) since they have t shares only, including the broadcasted ones. If less than t users are revoked, we broadcast the shares of some dummy users such that t shares are broadcasted totally. In order to achieve O(r) ciphertexts, we use log N polynomials, each for a range of the number of revoked users.
1. Setup(1 z , Id, U): z is the security parameter, Id is the identity name of the system, and U = {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U N } is the set of users in the system. Wlog, let N be a power of 2. Then, the system dealer does the following:
• Choose a generator g of group G, and let lg = log g and g 1 =ê(g, g).
The system dealer does not know the coefficients a (Id i j) . But, this does not matter.
• Randomly choose a secret ρ ∈ Z q and compute g ρ .
• Publish the public key P K = (Id,
• Assign a set
where • Let α = log l and L = 2 α .
• Compute h α = H 1 (Id α).
•
• Randomly select a session key m ∈ G 1 .
• Randomly select r ∈ Z q and compute, 1 ≤ t ≤ L,
• The ciphertext header Hdr (S, m) is
• The ciphertext body is C = E m (M ).
The user U k does the following.
• Use the Lagrange interpolation method to compute
where
• Compute the session key
• Use m to decrypt the ciphertext body C to obtain the message M .
Correctness. We can easily see that the scheme is correct by Equation (2).
Performance Analysis
For each system, the public key is (Id, H 1 , H 2 , E To prepare a header, the broadcaster needs to compute one pairing function, 2 α + 2 hash functions, and 2 α + 2 modular exponentiations, which is O(r) modular exponentiations.
For a user in S to decrypt a header, with a little re-arrangement of Equation (1) as
the user needs to perform 3 pairing functions and 2 α modular exponentiations, which is O(r) modular exponentiations. The evaluation of λ j 's can be done in O(L) = O(2r) if the header consists ofλ
The user can easily compute λ j 's fromλ j 's. Inclusion ofλ j 's in the header does not affect the order of the header size.
Security Analysis
We show that it has OW-CPA security in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption. (g, g a , g b , g c ) , where the pairing function is implicitly known. We set the system parameters as follows:
Set the public key of the system: (a) Let the input g be the generator g in the system. (b) Set
(c) The public key is (Id, H 1 , H 2 , E, G, G 1 ,ê, g, g a ) .
(d) The following is implicitly computed.
• Let g a
• For j = α, choose a random polynomial f j (x) and set h j = g z j , where z j is randomly chosen from Z q . 
Set the secret keys (g
r i,j , g r i,j f j (i) , g r i,j f j (0) h ρ j ), 0 ≤ j ≤ log N , of the revoked user U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ L, as follows: (a) For j = α, let g r i,α = g −b+µ i , g r i,α f α (i) = (g r i,α ) w i , and g r i,α f α (0) h ρ α = g (−b+µ i )(a+τ ) (g b+κ ) a = g a(µ i +κ)−bτ +µ i τ . (b) For j = α, randomly choose r i,j ∈ Z q and compute g r i,j , g r i,j f j (i) and g r i,j f j (0) h ρ j = g r i,j f j (0) (g a ) z j .
Set the header (α, mê(g
, which is again the same as that of the corresponding system parameters. The distributions of g r in the header and g ρ in the public key are both uniform over G since they are set from the given input g c and g a , respectively. Since the session key m is chosen randomly from G 1 , mê(g ρ , h α ) r is distributed uniformly over G 1 . We set it to a random value y ∈ G 1 . Even though we don't know about m, it does not affect the reduction. Other parameters are dependent on what have been discussed. We can check that they are all computed correctly. So, the reduction preserves the right distribution.
If the revoked users compute m from the header with probability , we can solve the BDH problem with the same probability 1 = by computing the following:
Let t be the time for this reduction and the solution computation in Equation (3) . We can see that t is polynomially bounded. Thus, if the collusion attack of the revoked users takes t 1 −t time, we can solve the BDH problem within time t 1 .
The PBE-PI Scheme with IND-CCA Security
In Theorem 1, we show that the session key in the header is one-way secure against any collusion of revoked users. There are some standard techniques of transforming OW-CPA security to IND-CCA security. Here we present such a scheme Π based on the technique in [9] .
The IND-CCA security of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation depends only on the OW-CPA security of the public key encryption scheme, the FG security of a symmetric encryption scheme E, and the γ-uniformity of the public key encryption scheme. The FG-security is the counterpart of the IND-security for symmetric encryption. A public key encryption scheme is γ-uniform if for every key pair (pk, sk), every message x, and y ∈ {0, 1} * , Pr[E pk (x) = y] ≤ γ. Before applying the transformation, we check the following things:
1. The transformation applies to public key encryption, while ours is public key broadcast encryption. Nevertheless, if the authorized set S is fixed, our public key broadcast encryption scheme is a public key encryption scheme with public key pk = (P K, S). In the definition of IND-CCA security (Definition 1), the adversary A selects a target set S * of users to attack in the Init stage and S * is fixed through the rest of the attack. Thus, we can discuss the attack of A with a fixed target set S * . Note that A is a static adversary.
2. Let S be a fixed authorized set of users. For every m and every y ∈ {0, 1} * , Pr[Hdr (S, m) = y] is either 0 or 1/q 1/2 z , where z is the security parameter (the public key size). Thus, our broadcast encryption scheme is 2 −z -uniform if the authorized set is fixed.
Let E : K × G 1 → G 1 be a symmetric encryption scheme with FG-security, where K is the key space of E. Let H 3 : G 1 × G 1 → Z q and H 4 : G 1 → K be two hash functions. The modification of Π for Π is as follows.
• In the Setup algorithm, add E, H 3 , H 4 to PK.
• In the Enc algorithm,
where σ is randomly chosen from G 1 and r = H 3 (σ, m).
• In the Dec algorithm, we first computeσ as described in the PBE-PI scheme. Then, we compute the session keym from E H 4 (σ) (m) by usingσ. We check whether σê( 
This theorem is proved by showing that if Π is not IND-CCA-secure, then either Π is not OW-CPA-secure or E is not FG-secure directly. The OW-CPA security of Π is based on the BDH assumption. We note that the application of the transformation to other types of schemes could be delicate. Galindo [10] pointed out such a case. Nevertheless, the problem occurs in the proof and is fixable without changing the transformation or the assumption. The detailed proof will be given in the full version of the paper.
A Public Key SD Scheme
In the paradigm of subset cover for broadcast encryption [16] , the system chooses a collection C of subsets of users such that each set S of users can be covered by the subsets in C, that is,
Each subset S i in C is associated with a private key k i . A user is assigned a set of keys such that he can derive the private keys of the subsets to which he belongs. The subset keys k i cannot be independent. Otherwise, each user may hold too many keys. It is preferable that the subset keys have some relations, for example, one can be derived from another. Thus, each user U k is given a set SK k of keys so that he can derive the private key of a subset to which he belongs. A subset-cover based broadcast encryption scheme plays the art of choosing a collection C of subsets, assigning subset and user keys, and finding subset covers.
Basic PBE-SD-PI Scheme
We now present our PBE-SD-PI scheme, which is constructed by using the polynomial interpolation technique on the collection of subsets in [16] . We first give such a scheme with O(log 2 N ) private keys and then show how to get the one with O(log N ) private key.
The system setup is similar to that of the PBE-PI scheme. Consider a complete binary tree T of log N + 1 levels. The nodes in T are numbered differently. Each user in U is associated with a different leaf node in T . We refer to a complete subtree rooted at node i as "subtree T i ". For each subtree T i of η levels (level 1 to level η from top to bottom), we define the degree-1 polynomials f
where a
For a user U k in the subtree T i of η levels, he is given the private keys
. . , i η are the nodes in the path from node i to the leaf node for U k (including both ends). We can read s k,i,j as the private key of U k for the jth level of subtree T i . In Figure 1 , the private keys (in the unmasked form) of U 1 and U 3 for subtree T i with η = 4 are given. Here, we use h ρ in all private keys in order to save space in the header. Recall that in the SD scheme, the collection C of subsets is {S i,t : node i is a parent of node t, i = t}, where S i,t denotes the set of users in subtree T i , but not in subtree T t . By our design, if the header contains a masked share for f
, where node t is in the j-th level of subtree T i , only user U k in S i,t can decrypt the header by using his private key s k,i,j , that is, the masked form of f (i) j (s), for some s = t. In Figure 1 , the share f 
where node t k is in the j k -th level of subtree
For decryption, a non-revoked user finds i k , t k , g
(t k ) (corresponding to S i k ,t k where he is in) from the header and applies the Lagrange interpolation to compute the session key m. Performance. The public key is O(1), which is the same as that of the PBE-PI scheme. Each user belongs to at most log N + 1 subtrees and each subtree has at most log N + 1 levels. For the subtree of η levels, the user in the subtree holds η − 1 private keys. Thus, the total number of shares (private keys) held by each user is log N i=1 i = O(log 2 N ). According to [16] , the number z of subsets in a subset cover is at most 2|R| − 1, which is O(r)
When the header streams in, a non-revoked user U k looks for his containing subset S i j ,t j to which he belongs. With a proper numbering of the nodes in T , this can be done very fast, for example, in O(log log N ) time. Without considering the time of scanning the header to find out his containing subset, each user needs to perform 2 modular exponentiations and 3 pairing functions. Thus, the decryption cost is O (1) .
Security. We first show that the scheme is one-way secure. (Id, H 1 , H 2 , E, G, G 1 ,ê, g, g ρ ) .
